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This paper examines the effects of collectively agreed increases in real minimum 
wages on employment transitions and hours among manual workers in the Swedish 
retail sector over the period 2001–05. The findings indicate that increases in real 
minimum wages are associated with more separations, whereas hours are less affected 
because separated workers put in relatively fewer hours before being separated. 
Among the young, however, both employment and hours are negatively affected. 
Labour-labour substitution seems to be important, since increases in minimum wages 
promote employment among workers with higher wages than those directly affected 
by the increases. The assumptions of the econometric model were tested by imposing 
fictitious minimum wages on lower-level non-manuals in the same industry, with 
turnover characteristics similar to those of manuals but covered by a different 
collective agreement with non-binding actual minimum wages.  
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1. Introduction 
Minimum wages in Sweden and the other Nordic countries are not regulated by law, 
but are subject to industry-wide bargaining between employers and trade unions. 
Since the coverage of collective agreements is high, the negotiated minimum wages 
effectively serve as wage floors, much in the way as a statutory minimum would. The 
collective agreements tend to also cover workers with atypical employment, such as 
those in fixed-term and part-time jobs. Minimum wage structures are highly complex, 
with different rates depending on, for example, age, occupation and experience. 
Negotiated minimum rates in the Nordic countries are among the highest in 
the world, both in absolute terms and in relation to median wages. In 2006, the 
Swedish minimum wage bite for unskilled workers in selected industries ranged 
between 61 and 71 per cent of median wages in the private sector, while the bite 
reached 63–73 per cent in Norway and 56–57 per cent in Finland (Skedinger, 2008). 
The corresponding figures for other countries, with a statutory minimum, are 
considerably lower in most cases. Minimum wage policies in the Nordic countries 
have contributed to the fact that few workers earn low wages and the virtual absence 
of the “working poor” phenomenon (Skedinger, 2010). 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of minimum wages on 
employment and working hours in the Swedish retail sector, an industry with binding 
minimum wages and employing relatively many young workers, part-timers and 
females. The study exploits payroll data for all unskilled manual workers covered by 
the industry collective agreement during 2001–08. Real minimum wages increased 
considerably over this period.  
The econometric approach in this paper relies on the identification of workers 
affected by minimum wage changes, depending on their position in the wage 
distribution, and contrasts outcomes for these workers to those for unaffected workers, 
with slightly higher wages. The hypothesis in the standard competitive model of the 
labour market is that increasing minimum wages contribute to more separations from 
employment in the affected group and that decreasing minimum wages are associated 
with more job accessions, while total hours worked should decrease (increase) with 
increasing (decreasing) minimum wages. Relaxing the assumption that efficiency 
units are the product of hours and workers, Strobl and Walsh (2010) show that effects 
of minimum wages on employment and total hours are ambiguous in a competitive 
model framework. The predictions regarding changes in hours among remaining 3 
 
workers (in case of an increasing minimum) and already employed workers (in case of 
a decrease) are ambiguous, even in the standard competitive model.   
The econometric approach is similar in spirit to the ones used by, for example, 
Currie and Fallick (1996), Zavodny (2000) and Neumark et al. (2004) for the US, 
Abowd et al. (2000) for the US and France, Kramarz and Philippon (2001) for France,  
Stewart (2004) for the UK and Skedinger (2006) for Sweden. With the exception of 
Zavodny (2000) and Abowd et al. (2000) for the US (but not France), and Stewart 
(2004), these studiers find that minimum wages create disemployment effects. Few 
studies have attempted to estimate the effects of minimum wages on hours and the 
results are mixed. The results in Couch and Wittenburg (2001) and Stewart and 
Swaffield (2008) suggest an hours-reducing effect of increasing minimum wages in 
the US and the UK, respectively, while Böckerman and Uusitalo (2009), Zavodny 
(2000) and, for the UK, Connolly and Gregory (2002) and Dickens et al. (2009) find 
small or no significant changes in hours worked.  
Despite the obvious potential for strong disemployment effects of minimum 
wages that cut large into the wage distribution, very few studies on the subject exist in 
the Nordic countries. Skedinger (2006) finds that increasing minimum wages decrease 
employment in Swedish hotels and restaurants during the period 1979–99. The 
introduction of special and lower rates for teenagers in 1993 eliminated negative 
employment effects of subsequent increases for this particular group of workers. For 
Finland, Böckerman and Uusitalo (2009) are unable to find any employment-
increasing effects of the introduction of sub-minimum wages for young workers in the 
retail sector in 1993–95. The different results for Sweden and Finland may be due to 
the fact that the Finnish minimum wage reform was of a temporary nature, while the 
lower rates for teenagers in Sweden were permanent.  
A crucial assumption of the chosen econometric approach is that transitions in 
and out of employment and changes in hours do not differ between affected (the 
treatment group) and unaffected workers (the control group) beyond what is captured 
by available controls, such as worker and firm characteristics. If unobserved variables, 
correlated with minimum wage changes, contribute to, for example, fewer transitions 
among high wage workers than among workers with lower pay, this assumption is 
violated. For example, one could imagine that turnover is higher among low-paid 
workers for structural reasons. Unlike previous studies, I am able to check the 
robustness of the estimates in this respect by considering, as an alternative control 4 
 
group, workers in the same industry with the same wages as the treatment group, and 
with similar turnover characteristics, but who are not covered by the minimum wages. 
Lower-level non-manual workers are covered by a different agreement, with lower 
and non-binding minimum wages, and thus seem suitable for examining differences in 
structural turnover across groups in the wage distribution.  
The data set is rich and contains detailed information on various wage 
components, age, gender, occupation, region, various measures of hours worked and 
firm size. Data on minimum wages have been added from the collective agreements. 
Many manual workers in Swedish retail are on part-time schedules, so there should be 
a potential for adjustment through changing hours in this industry.  
The following section of this paper discusses the fixing mechanisms of 
minimum wages in the retail industry and the evolution of minimum wages over time. 
The data set is described in Section 3, while the econometric model and the results are 
presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes the paper.     
 
2. Minimum wages in the retail trade 
In the Swedish retail sector, minimum wages for manual workers are determined in 
collective agreements between the Commercial Employees’ Union 
(Handelsanställdas förbund) and the Swedish Trade Federation (Svensk Handel). The 
agreements specify contractual wage increases as well as minimum wage levels at the 
industry level for various categories of workers. Since minimum wages are never 
bargained over at the firm level, it seems reasonable to assume that these rates are 
exogenous to the firm in its decisions on hirings and firings.  
The agreement period varies and has been 1 year during the period 1 April 
1998 – 31 March 2001 and 3 years for agreements concluded since 1 April 2001. 
Regardless of contract length, contractual wage increases and minimum wage levels 
are determined for each year during the period.   
Minimum rates are specified on hourly as well as monthly bases and are 
conditional on age and experience. Different rates apply for workers aged 16, 17, 18 
and 19 or older. For workers aged 18 or older who have acquired industry-specific 
experience, rates increase with 1, 2 or 3 or more years of such experience. Thus seven 
different minimum rates apply for manual workers in the retail sector. During unsocial 5 
 
hours, all basic wages, including the minimum rates, are subject to a premium 
between 50 and 100 per cent, depending on when the work is carried out.
1  
Figure 1 displays the evolution of various hourly minimum wages, for regular 
working hours, deflated by the output price in retail, for manual workers aged 18 or 
older over the period 1998–2008.
2 Real minimum rates have increased considerably: 
The minimum, in 2008 prices, for an 18-year-old stood at SEK 70.84 in 1998 and rose 
to 94.90 in 2008, which represents an increase of 34 per cent in real terms.
3 For a 
worker aged 19 or older with at least 3 years’ experience, the increase was 25 per 
cent, from SEK 88.33 in 1998 to 110.14 in 2008. Only in one year, 2008, real 
minimum rates did not rise and this is due to a fairly large price hike (6.6 per cent) in 
this particular year. Over the period taken as a whole, output prices increased at the 
relatively modest rate of 14.8 per cent.        
The minimum wage bite is presented in Figure 2. The bites are large and have 
continued to increase over time for most worker categories to reach 85 per cent of the 
industry median wage for 18-year-olds and even as high as 99 per cent for workers on 
the highest minimum. The bite has increased to varying degrees and much less than 
real minimum wages, from 1 percentage point for the highest minimum wage group to 
6 percentage points for the lowest, so that the minimum wage structure has become 
more compressed over time. The rising median wages that lie behind this 
development reflect the positive growth in the industry over the period, fuelled by 
rising disposable incomes and increasing private consumption. Figure 3 shows the 
development of employment and hours per worker over the period 2000–09, in retail 
and in the economy as a whole. In retail, employment has increased at a rather steady 
rate. After having decreased in the first half the decade, hours per worker returned to 
or surpassed its initial level by the end of the period 
In order to further illustrate how the minimum wage system in retail works 
over time, Figure 4 depicts the steep “minimum wage path” facing an imaginary 18-
year-old worker, hired at three different points in time, 1998, 2001 and 2004. An 18-
year-old hired in, say 1998, is subject to the minimum wage of a 19-year-old with 1 
year’s experience in 1999, and so on. Assuming the minimum wage employee is hired 
                                                 
1 The premium is 50 per cent for work on Mondays to Fridays between 6.15 PM and 8 PM, 70 per cent 
on Mondays to Fridays after 8 PM and 100 per cent on Saturdays after 12 AM, on Sundays and on 
public holidays.  
2 The rates applying to minors (16- and 17-year-olds) are not shown. These workers are not included in 
the payroll data.          
3 94.90 SEK was equivalent to 14.42 USD and 9.88 EUR in 2008.   6 
 
in 1998 with a pay equivalent to his or her marginal product, worker productivity 
needs to increase by at least 26 per cent by 2001, in relation to the productivity of the 
median worker, for the employee to keep the job. The path for a similar worker hired 
in 2004 was less steep, though, requiring a productivity increase of at least 19 per cent 
by 2007. On the other hand, the entry point in 2004 implied a 6 per cent higher 
marginal productivity than in 1998.  
The minimum wage numbers for non-manual workers in the same sector tell a 
rather different story. Here, the minimum rates are differentiated only by age and they 
are considerably lower, both in absolute terms and in relation to median wages 
(among non-manuals). In 2008, minimum wages for 20- to 23-year-olds amounted to 
SEK 83.73 and 98.19 for 24-year-olds or over.
4 Moreover, Figure 5 reveals that 
minimum wage bites for non-manual workers have declined over time, from 76 to 71 
per cent for those aged 24 or more and from 64 to 60 per cent for 20–23-year-olds 
since 1999, when the special rate for the latter group was introduced.  
Non-manuals in retail may be covered by different collective agreements. The 
minimum rates in the figure are derived from the employers’ agreement with 
Tjänstemannaförbundet HTF (merged into Unionen in 2008), which was the major 
agreement in the sector during the period of study, covering lower-level occupations 
requiring only secondary education (equivalent to senior high school in the US or 
sixth form grammar school in the UK), such as clerks and salespersons. Similarly, the 
median wage relates to such lower-level jobs.  
 
3. The data and the sample partition  
The data set has been obtained from the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt 
Näringsliv) and covers all member firms of the employer organization the Swedish 
Trade Federation over the period 1998–2008. There are 13,000 member firms with a 
total of 300,000 employees in the Federation, implying a coverage of about two thirds 
of all employees in Swedish retail (Svensk Handel, 2011). The observations are 
annual and refer to September each year. The firms are bound by the collective 
agreements signed by the Federation and these cover all employees, regardless of 
union membership.  
                                                 
4 Hourly rates have been converted from monthly, assuming a 40-hour working week.   7 
 
The data are based on payroll records and include information on employee 
category (manual or non-manual), various components of pay, actual and usual hours 
worked, gender, age, occupation, region and number of employees in the firm.  
Since real minimum wages decline in one year only (2008), the analysis is 
limited to examining the employment consequences of increasing minimum wages. 
The sample period is further restricted to exclude the year 2007, due to tax reforms 
introduced in that year which are likely to confound the results.
5     
The data set contains unique identifiers for firms and workers. The definition 
of separations follows standard procedures in the kind of data used here. A separation 
in year t+1 is defined as the worker being present in the data in year t, but not in t+1, 
while the firm was present in both t and t+1 (but not necessarily during other periods). 
It is not possible to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary separations in the 
data. Since some, mostly small, firms for various reasons may not report data in a 
given year, even though they are still members of the Federation, this procedure 
ensures that the employees of non-reporting firms are not erroneously classified as 
separated. It should be noted that separations thus are defined in relation to 
employment in the industry, not in the firm. Given that involuntary separations cannot 
be identified, separations defined in this way capture relatively more exits into 
unemployment than a firm-based measure. 
Since not all retail firms are members of the Federation, a transition to a non-
member firm may erroneously be classified as a separation in the data. However, there 
is little to suggest that transitions to non-member firms serve as escape routes from 
high minimum wages to any large extent.
 6 The collective agreements influence norms 
for wage-setting also in non-member firms and Swedish labour law grants far-
reaching rights to unions taking action against firms without collective agreements, 
regardless of whether the firms pay sub-minimum wages or not.  
The computation of changes in hours (between t and t+1) is also conditioned 
on the presence of the firm in the data in two subsequent years. The measure of hours 
is based on usual hours, not actual, in order to filter out disturbances specific to the 
reporting month. A worker not present in the data is assigned a value of zero hours.  
                                                 
5 Payroll tax rates were cut for young workers and the reduction continued into 2008. In addition, 
earned income tax credits were introduced and became more generous in 2008. 
6 Escape routes to employment in other low-wage industries, like hotels and restaurants, should be 
restricted, too, since minimum rates are similar there (Skedinger, 2010).    
 8 
 
The data contain a direct measure of the regular hourly wage (fast timlön), 
which is likely to be measured with less error than the more commonly available 
alternative in the form of an hourly wage calculated as wages divided by hours (over a 
given period). A minority of manual workers in the retail industry are salaried. For 
these workers, regular full-time monthly wages (fast heltidsmånadslön) have been 
transformed into regular hourly wages under the assumption of a 40-hour working 
week. The wage concept used thus excludes premiums for unsocial hours, overtime 
pay, bonuses and fringe benefits, in order to correspond to the minimum wage in the 
collective agreements.  
Minimum wages for manual workers have been collected from the Retail 
Agreement (Detaljhandelsavtalet) and from circulars, distributed by the Federation to 
employers, for non-manuals. Each worker in the data set has been assigned a 
minimum wage, depending on the relevant personal characteristics, such as worker 
category, age and professional experience within the industry. There is no explicit 
information in the data set on experience, which is one of the determinants of 
minimum wages for manual workers. Instead, this information had to be imputed 
from the data.
7 Since minimum wages take into account experience up to 3 years, this 
procedure eliminated the same number of years from the data set (1998–2000). Due to 
the nature of the data set, with some firms opting not to report, imputed experience is 
understating actual experience for some workers (which implies too low a minimum 
wage). Tenure with the firm, which is an explanatory variable in the regressions, has 
also been computed by me and along similar lines.   
The analysis of manual workers is limited to cashiers and sales staff, the two 
major occupations that are covered by the Retail Agreement. Observations on cashiers 
and salespersons constitute 95 per cent of the data for manual workers. Only lower-
level occupations among non-manuals were included, such as clerks and sales staff, 
amounting to 22 per cent of the observations for non-manuals. There is no 
information on education in the data, but given the narrowly defined occupations I 
regard this to be of little concern. Workers with very low or high wages have been 
excluded (below 75 per cent of the minimum wage or more than three times the 
median wage). Finally, workers with multiple jobs were excluded since a unique 
                                                 
7 According to the collective agreements, experience counts only if the worker has worked at least 10 
hours per week. This rule is taken into account in the computation of workers’ experience in the 
empirical analysis. 9 
 
minimum wage could not be defined for these workers. After these exclusions, the 
number of observations for manuals is 246,811.   
Figure 6 shows the hourly wage distribution for manual workers in the sample, 
in 2008. The various minimum wages are indicated by the vertical lines A–E. The 
spikes at these rates suggest that minimum wages are indeed binding for manuals in 
the retail industry. The spikes are quite distinct, with no smoothing around the 
minimum rates, which indicates that wages are measured with little error. Between 2 
and 8 per cent of workers are on each of the five minimum wages and more than one 
fourth (28 per cent) are on either of them.
8 The distribution of monthly wages 
pertaining to non-manuals, shown in Figure 7, is quite different and closer to the 
textbook version of wage distributions in competitive labour markets. A mere 0.5 per 
cent of these workers are on either of the two minimums. The spikes that do appear in 
the figure can be explained by clustering at round number salaries, like 20,000 or 
25,000 SEK, rather than clustering at minimum wages (at A and B). This suggests that 
minimum rates are not binding for lower-level non-manuals.              
As in previous empirical analyses of the employment effects of minimum 
wages conditional on the worker’s position in the wage distribution, the data set is 
partitioned into four groups, (see, e.g., Abowd et al., 2000). The idea behind this 
exercise is to identify workers affected by minimum wage changes – the “treatment” 
group – and a suitable “control” group, close to the treatment group in the wage 
distribution but assumed not to be affected by minimum wage changes.  
For increasing real minimum wages, i.e., mwt < mwt+1, the four groups are 
defined as follows:   
 
Below:   wt < mwt  
Treatment:   mwt ≤  wt  < mwt+1 
Control:  mwt+1 ≤ wt  < 1.05(mwt+1) 
High:    wt  ≥ 1.05(mwt+1), 
 
                                                 
8 There is a large spike to the right of and close to the highest minimum wage (E). A possible 
explanation for this spike is that many workers, after more than 3 years’ experience, are awarded 
common and negotiated wage increases over and above the minimum wage increase. High attrition 
among workers would then smooth out the wage distribution to the right of this spike. Another 
possibility is that some employers set wages slightly above the highest minimum wage in order to 
attract more productive workers.   
 10 
 
where w is the real wage and mw is the real minimum wage, both deflated by the 
output price. 
With increasing minimum wages, and under the assumption that workers are 
paid their marginal product, a worker belonging to the treatment group is at peril of 
being laid off unless his or her productivity increases enough in order to match the 
higher minimum. Workers in the control group, with slightly higher wages (arbitrarily 
set at a maximum of 5 per cent higher in the chosen specification), are however not 
directly affected by the minimum wage increase. Assuming constant marginal 
productivity, the hypothesis, in line with the competitive model, is that workers in the 
treatment group, but not in the control, are laid off as a result of the minimum wage 
increase. Micro data on wages typically include some workers who, for various 
reasons, are paid less than the minimum wage. These workers are assigned to the 
“below” group and thus do not form part of the treatment group.    
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the four groups of manual workers in the 
sample (with some information also on non-manuals).  It is apparent that many 
manual workers in retail are affected by minimum wage changes as 41 per cent of 
observations belong to the treatment group. Around 5 per cent of observations are 
sub-minimum. These observations may be explained by some employers not (yet) 
having adjusted wage levels to the recent collective agreement or measurement errors, 
most likely occurring in the tenure variable. If tenure is underestimated, due to some 
firms being absent in the data, the minimum wage rate pertaining to these workers 
will also be underestimated.  Despite the narrowly defined wage interval (5 per cent) 
relative to other studies in the field, the control group among manual workers contains 
many observations (19 per cent). Given the compressed wage structure in Sweden, 
this observation is not out of line with expectations.     
Real minimum wage increases, measured as log mwt+1 – log mwt, are higher, 
on average, in the treatment group than in other groups. The average increase among 
the treated manual workers was 7.9 per cent, with a variation (not shown in the table) 
between 0.1 and 14.8 per cent. There is thus substantial variation in minimum wage 
increases, both over time and across worker groups.  
Many manual workers are part-timers in the retail industry and their usual 
hours worked per week ranges between 27 and 31 on average, depending on sample 
group. In general, the lower-paid work fewer hours. For example, individuals in the 
treatment group work over 5 hours less per week than those in the control. The change 11 
 
in hours among all workers is negative (partly by construction of the variable, since 
separated workers are assigned zero hours).  For workers remaining in the industry, 
changes are positive but relatively small, less than 1 hour.  
Turnover is very high, with 37 per cent of manuals separating in the industry 
each year in the treatment group (recall that the measure relates to exits from the 
industry, and excludes transitions between firms within the industry).
9 A worker’s 
attachment to the job is likely to influence mobility. There is unfortunately no direct 
information on the use of fixed-term contracts, which is widespread in the industry, 
but there are other variables in the data which could help capture the degree of 
attachment to the job. Besides part-time status and the hourly wage, there is a variable 
in the data set indicating whether the worker is salaried and there is also information 
on the share of unsocial hours pay of total pay. Salaried workers are typically less 
mobile while workers with much unsocial hours pay are likely to be students working 
mainly during evenings and weekends, with little long-term attachment to the job. 
Among the treated manuals, around 11 per cent are salaried and 19 per cent of total 
pay is compensation for unsocial hours, on average. Here, the variation among 
workers is large, with many having no such pay at all and some earning almost all 
their pay from working unsocial hours.  
Working hours should be influenced by available variables, such as age, 
gender, occupation and wage. However, family-related variables, in particular the 
presence of small children in the household, are among probable determinants of 
working hours, at least among females, that are missing in the data set.   
Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for lower-level non-manuals, who have 
been assigned to the four groups based on the fictitious minimum wage structure for 
manuals (the table reports statistics only for the treatment and the control groups). 
Although relatively fewer workers among non-manuals are found in the treatment and 
control groups, turnover characteristics are very similar. For example, 38 per cent in 
the treatment group are separated next period, which is close to the figure for 
manuals. An important difference, though, is that non-manuals rarely work part-time 
and that they put in longer hours than manuals, about 34 hours per week on average. 
The lower incidence of part-time work among non-manuals may be explained by their 
                                                 
9 Since it is likely that some workers in the industry are employed only part of the year and then return 
to their employer and that there are workers who are temporarily absent, due to, e.g., parental leave, 
these figures represent an upper bound of  “real “ turnover.  12 
 
tasks being less tied to unsocial shop hours and fluctuating customer demand than is 
the case for manual workers. Table 1 also shows that non-manuals tend to be 
somewhat older than manuals in the corresponding groups.  
 
4. Econometric specification 
For workers within each group k (Below, Treatment, Control and High) with 
increasing minimum wages, the interacted variables Ik(log mwt+1 – log mwt) are 
defined, where I is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if the worker belongs to group k 
= 1, 2, 3, 4 and zero otherwise. The increase in minimum wages, within parenthesis 
above, is the same for all k, given age and experience.  
  In the regression model in which separations are investigated, the worker 
either is separated from the job in the next period (Y=1) or is not (Y=0). For ease of 
computation and interpretation, the estimations are implemented through OLS (but 
experiments with binomial logit will also be performed).
10 For increasing minimum 
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where X is a vector of additional explanatory variables assumed to influence worker 
transitions (with individual indices suppressed). As in most of the related literature, 
these controls include the real hourly wage (deflated by cpi), age, age squared, job 
tenure, the number of employees in the firm and its square and dummies for gender, 
occupation, year and region. In my specification, I add dummies for salaried work, 
part-time work and the share of unsocial hours of total pay in order to capture 
attachment to the job. The equation error is denoted by ε.       
In the regressions with changes in hours (H) as the dependent (and continuous) 
variable, the same estimation technique and basically the same sets of variables are 
used as in (1). With increasing minimum wages, ΔH = Ht+1–Ht, where workers non-
employed at t+1 are assigned zero hours.    
The difference between the coefficients for the treatment and the control group 
(β2– β3) is interpreted as the effect among the treated of increasing minimum wages 
                                                 
10 Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 107) argue that it is “fairly robustly true” that marginal effects are 
similar in empirical applications of linear and non-linear regression models. 13 
 
on separations or hours in (1). This interpretation of the coefficients relies on a 
number of assumptions. Firstly, there should be no unobserved variables that are 
correlated with being low-paid, on the one hand, and employment transitions and 
hours, on the other hand. Secondly, the control group should not be affected by 
changes in minimum wages. If wage spillovers exist, due to production technology or 
relative wage consideration, this assumption is violated.   Production technology may 
imply that different types of labour are substitutes or complements.  In addition, the 
estimation technique used in this paper requires that increases in minimum wages 
have a larger impact on actual wages in the treatment than in the control group. These 
assumptions will be discussed in more detail in the next section, which presents the 
econometric results. 
 
5. Econometric results 
Table 2 shows regression results for the impact of minimum wage increases on 
employment among manual workers. All individuals have been assigned to one of the 
four groups “below”, “treatment”, “control” and “high”, with the latter as a reference 
category. The group dummies are interacted with the increase in minimum wages, as 
in equation (1). Of particular interest is the test for equality of the coefficients for the 
treatment and control groups, that is, whether β2–β3=0.   
Besides the interacted group dummies, all specifications in the table include 
worker and firm-specific controls as well as region and year dummies (which are 
unreported for brevity). The first three columns relate to separations. In the second 
column, the sample is restricted to a balanced panel of firms and the third column 
adds firm-specific effects to the specification. The first regression shows that 
separations increase more in the treatment group than in the control. According to the 
coefficients, one percentage point’s increase in the real minimum wage  is associated 
with an increase in the separation rate among the treated that is 0.136 percentage 
points higher than in the “high” group. The coefficient for the control group is –0.171, 
suggesting that substitution takes place between the treated and the control.
11  The 
difference between the two coefficients is 0.307, which taken at face value could be 
interpreted as a causal effect of minimum wages on separations among the treated. 
This effect is not far off the corresponding elasticity for Swedish hotels and 
                                                 
11 This interpretation is in line with Persson (1999), who finds that substitution between worker 
categories, especially young workers and adult females, is important in Swedish retail and wholesale 
trade.     14 
 
restaurants reported in Skedinger (2006), which is about 0.5. The unreported worker 
and firm-specific controls mostly work according to expectations. Increasing age, 
tenure and wage contribute significantly to fewer separations. Variables proxying for 
attachment to the job – part-time work, salaried position and unsocial hours pay in 
relation to total pay – all indicate that less attachment is associated with more 
separations.  
The regressions with a balanced panel of firms in the second and third 
columns result in a loss of observations of 8 per cent in the sample and a loss of 29 
per cent of the firms. Without firm fixed effects, the estimated effect β2–β3 is identical 
to the one in the larger sample in the first column, and it increases somewhat, to 
0.370, as firm fixed effects are introduced.     
Thus the results so far in Table 2 align with expectations from the competitive 
model in that increases in the minimum wages are associated with more separations. 
What about the effect of minimum wages on hours worked? The regressions in 
Columns (4) – (9) of Table 2 attempt to answer this question, using the same 
specifications as for separations. To begin with, in Columns (4) – (6), all workers are 
considered regardless of employment status (with non-employed workers assigned 
zero hours). In Columns (7) – (9), only workers employed in both periods are 
included in the regressions.     
The estimated effects of increasing minimum wages on hours for all workers 
is –0.043 when firm fixed effects are imposed, but otherwise insignificant, implying 
that hours decrease at the most by around 2.5 minutes for each percentage point’s 
increase in the real minimum wage, which is a modest effect. Nor did remaining 
workers change their hours much, according to the rightmost regressions in Table 2. 
The estimate is positive, but insignificant. 
Why is the impact on hours so small? As noted in Table 1, the treated put in 
fewer hours than the control, and a further look at the data shows that is true also for 
separated workers in the two groups. Apparently the reduction of hours caused by the 
increase in separations among the treated is counteracted by the fact that relatively 
fewer hours are lost among them.      
One crucial assumption in the econometric framework used in this paper is 
that there should be no unobserved variables that affect employment transitions (or 
hours) and the likelihood of belonging to the treatment or control group. It is, for 
example, conceivable that turnover is higher among the low-paid for structural 15 
 
reasons, unrelated to changes in the minimum wages. The presence of a group of 
lower-level non-manuals in the retail industry – with less binding minimum wages – 
offers a possibility to test whether other factors than changes in minimum wages 
contribute to employment transitions. The two groups of workers are similar as far as 
turnover at given wages and skills are concerned (see Table 1). However, since work 
patterns in terms of hours are quite different it seems not useful to include the effect 
on hours in the examination. 
Table 3 includes both manual and non-manual workers and imposes the 
minimum wage structure pertaining to manual workers on all workers.  This means 
that the non-manuals have been assigned fictitious minimum wages and the purpose 
behind this exercise is to investigate to what extent the results for separations and 
changes in hours in Table 2 for manuals can be explained by the presence of structural 
turnover, not accounted for by the explanatory variables.  
Before estimation, observations for lower-levels non-manuals potentially 
affected by changes in actual minimum wages were filtered out. That is, with mwt < 
mwt+1, observations fulfilling the condition that wt < mwt+1, where mw denotes the real 
minimum wage for non-manuals, were excluded.  As expected, this procedure 
eliminated few observations: 1.4 per cent of the 44,762 observations for non-manuals.  
According to Table 3, where the additional coefficients β4 - β7 refer to non-
manuals, the impact of increases in minimum wages on the “treated” among non-
manuals is small and the difference β5 - β6 is insignificant (and even negative), which 
lends support to the assumptions underlying the econometric model.  
Another concern with the regressions so far is that the estimation technique 
used in this paper requires that increases in the minimum wages for manuals have a 
larger impact on actual wages among manuals in the treatment than in the control 
group. This assumption is tested, and receives support, in the first column of Table 4. 
According to the results, real wage growth among manuals increases by 0.144 
percentage points more in the treatment group than in the control when real minimum 
wages increase by 1 percentage point. The conjecture that increases in minimum 
wages among manuals affect wage growth among “treated” non-manuals, through 
interdependence in the production process or relative wage considerations, is however 
rejected, as demonstrated in the second column of Table 4.   
Table 5 presents additional robustness checks for manual workers (for brevity, 
only the difference β2–β3 is reported).  These checks deal with measurement errors in 16 
 
the experience variable, heterogeneous effects across groups as well as alternative 
estimation methods.     
As discussed previously, experience within the industry may be measured with 
error and minimum wages are partly based on this experience. Alternative estimations 
attempt to minimize the influence of possibly mismeasured experience. For workers 
above the age of 18 and with at least three years of recorded experience the minimum 
wage is known with certainty, since minimum rates do not increase with additional 
years of experience. The first row of Table 5 presents estimates for a subsample of 
workers with a minimum of three years’ experience within the industry. A drawback 
with this exercise is that the subsample is scarcely representative in an industry with 
large turnover and minimum wages could have a larger impact among workers with 
less experience. On the whole, the basic results are strengthened. For separations the 
estimate is larger than in Table 2 (0.497) and there is now a distinct negative effect on 
overall hours (–0.084), which speaks for the possibility that measurement errors have 
biased results downwards in the original estimations.  
Rows 2–5  consider heterogeneity in treatment effects across groups. It is of 
some interest to check whether the results are different when analysing just young 
workers, aged 18–24, as is done in the second row. The results reveal that primarily 
the negative effects on overall hours (–0.131) are more pronounced among the young, 
but the effect on separations is also slightly larger than for workers in general. A way 
to potentially reduce unobserved heterogeneity between the treatment and control 
groups is to let those within the relevant wage interval who have previously been 
treated form the control group for the treated in year t (known as “staggered 
treatment”). The estimates, in row 3, point to stronger effects on separations and 
overall hours than those reported in Table 2. In rows 4–5, robustness to different wage 
intervals is tested, using a slightly narrower interval (2.5 per cent) and a slightly wider 
one (7.5 per cent). The results indicate that the effect on separations decreases 
somewhat as the wage interval is widened.  
The results so far only consider affected workers versus those slightly above 
the minimum wage. However, it is possible that those individuals whose wage is 
further below the minimum wage prior to  an increase face increased probabilities of 
separation. An alternative specification that allows for this is to use a wage gap 
measure, which is the percentage increase in the wage required to take the individual 
up to the new minimum (see, for example, Currie and Fallick, 1996, and Zavodny, 17 
 
2000). Workers whose wages were previously above the new minimum are assigned a 
zero value of the wage gap variable and thus form an implicit control group. Workers 
below the initial minimum wage are excluded from the sample, for comparability with 
previous estimates. The wage gap estimates, in row 6 of Table 5, do not diverge much 
from the results in Table 2.  Unlike the latter, however, wage gap estimates do not 
provide information about substitution effects. 
 Finally, the regression for separations was rerun using logit. The estimated 




This paper has examined the effects of increases in real minimum wages on 
separations and hours worked in the Swedish retail sector during 2001–05.  The 
econometric framework relies on the identification of workers affected by minimum 
wage increases, depending on their position in the wage distribution, and contrasts 
outcomes for these workers to those for a control group of workers, with slightly 
higher wages.  
The boom experienced in the industry during the period analysed implies that 
the cards have been stacked against finding strong results on employment from 
minimum wage increases. Despite this, the initial analysis, for manual workers, 
suggests that separations do increase as minimum wages increase. The findings also 
indicate that substitution between worker groups in response to changes in minimum 
wages is important in retail; for example, as minimum wages increase more workers 
are separated in the treatment group, but fewer workers are separated in the control. 
The median worker is located in the control group, according to Table 1. Thus the 
results showing disemployment effects in the treatment group and the opposite 
outcome in the control seem consistent with a union model in which members bargain 
over a minimum wage that maximizes the utility of the median voter (Booth, 1984).  
In general, though, total hours and hours per remaining worker do not change 
much as minimum wages increase, but there is a distinct negative effect on overall 
hours among the young. On the whole, the loss of hours due to more separations 
among the treated seems to be mitigated by the fact that these workers initially put in 
relatively fewer hours. This result suggests that analyses that deal with employment 
consequences of increasing minimum wages solely by examining worker flows, but 18 
 
disregard hours, may exaggerate the overall decline in employment to the extent that 
job losses are concentrated among low-paid, part-time workers.  
The assumptions underlying the model were tested by including non-manual 
workers in the analysis. Lower-level non-manuals in the industry exhibit turnover 
characteristics similar to those of manuals at given wages, but differ in one important 
respect: minimum wages are much lower and not binding. By imposing the minimum 
wage structure pertaining to manuals on non-manuals it was possible to examine 
whether the findings obtained for manuals are indeed attributable to increases in 
minimum wages – and not to something else. As the fictitious minimum wages had 
only a small impact on separations among “treated” non-manuals, the underlying 
assumptions were supported.  
The main conclusions turned out to be fairly robust to numerous checks, 
including experiments with different subsamples of workers, different wage intervals 
and wage gap estimates. 
The purpose of this paper has been to identify effects of increases in minimum 
wages for a narrowly defined group, namely those directly affected by these changes. 
Hence it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the impact on overall employment 
in the retail sector of the reduction of payroll taxes in 2007–08. This issue will be 
explored in future research, which will also take into account the additional reduction 
of payroll taxes in 2009, with the intention of considering more broadly defined 
worker groups and not just those affected by changes in minimum wage costs. 
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Figure 1. Real minimum wages for manual workers, by age and experience, 
1998–2008. SEK per hour  
 
Note: Minimum wages deflated by the output price in retail, index 2008=1.  





Figure 2. Minimum wage bites for manual workers, by age and experience, 1998–
2008. Per cent 
 
Note: Minimum wages as a percentage of median wages for manuals in the industry.  
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Figure 3. Employment (N) and hours per worker (H) in retail and in the whole 
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Source: Statistics Sweden, National Accounts. 
 
 
Figure 4. Minimum wage paths for manual workers, hired as 18-year-olds at different 
points in time, 1998–2008. Per cent 
 
Note: Minimum wages for workers continuing in employment, as a percentage of median wages for 
manuals in the industry.  
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Figure 5. Minimum wage bites for lower-level non-manual workers, by age, 1998–
2008. Per cent 
 
Note: Minimum wages as a percentage of median wages in the industry for non-manuals in occupations 
requiring secondary education.  



































Note: Minimum wages are indicated by vertical lines: A = 18-year-olds; B = 19-year-olds or over 
without experience; C = 19-year-olds or over with 1 year’s experience; D = 19-year-olds or over with 2 
years’ experience; E = 19-year-olds or over with at least 3 years’ experience. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 





Note: Minimum wages are indicated by vertical lines: A = 20–23-year-olds; B = 24-year-olds or over. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for manual workers (M) and lower-level non-manuals 
(NM), by position in the wage distribution, 2001–05 
 
 




Treated  Control 
 
High  
M  M  NM  M  NM 
Separated                              0.390  0.365  0.381  0.208  0.278  0.248 
Weekly hours                                                  26.77  24.17  34.43  29.65  35.59  30.99 
 
Change in hours, all 
workers  
–9.75        –7.94   –12.56  –5.59   –9.55            –6.85 
Change in hours, 
remaining  workers                  
0.34           0.70   0.19  0.28   –0.08  0.35 
Increase in real hourly 
minimum wage         
0.066             0.079   0.078    0.048        0.061      0.058 
Real hourly wage, 
SEK                                   
87.30          92.87      95.97     103.99    103.25  113.24 
Age  25.66          26.81  29.47    37.32  35.52     36.66 
Male  0.307         0.260  0.262  0.194   0.238       0.353 
Occupation: 
Salesperson                                 
0.884         0.852   0.235     0.858   0.159  0.915 
Job tenure: < 1 year                                                          
                      1 year                                                              
                      2 years                                                             
                  ≥ 3 years                                                         
0.306        
0.324        
0.149       
0.222        












0.272       
0.152 
0.166 





Part-time                                                            0.450         0.527   0.173  0.371   0.128  0.299 
Salaried     0.222         0.110   0.687  0.225   0.867  0.431 
Unsocial hours pay of 
total pay                        
0.186         0.193   0.039  0.134   0.027  0.109 
No. employees                                                     782            750   680  775   670  776 
No. obs.                                                           12,479      100,646   1,298  47,320   2,447  86,366 
Per cent of total obs  5.1             40.8   2.9  19.2   5.5  35.0 
 




Table 2. Employment regressions for  manual workers  
 
  Separations  Hours – all   Hours – remaining workers 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 






















































Panel  of firms  N  Y  Y  N  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 





















R-squared   0.079  0.081  0.103  0.034  0.035  0.085  0.009  0.010  0.027 
No. observations  246,811  227,046  245,704  226,084  172,883  159,775 
No. firms  2,273  1,611  2,273  1,611  2,244  1,590 
 
Note: The regressions consider workers aged 18–64 and are estimated by OLS over the period 2001–05. All regressions control for  the real wage (deflated by cpi), age and 
its square, number of employees in the firm and its square, share of unsocial hours pay of total pay and dummies for region, year, gender, tenure, occupation ,  salaried work 
and part-time work (except in the hours regressions). A constant (not reported) is included in all regressions. Coefficients are divided by 100 in the hours regressions. 
Absolute t-values, robust for clustering of standard errors at the firm level, within parentheses. P-values within brackets.  
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Table 3. Employment regressions including both manual (M) and lower-level non-
manual (NM) workers  
 
  Separations 
(1)  (2)  (3) 










































Panel  of firms  N  Y  Y 

















R-squared   0.087  0.088  0.116 
No. observations  290,943  266,168 
No. firms  3,178  2,281 
 
Note: See notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
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 Table 4. Wage growth regressions 
 
  Manuals  Non-manuals 








β3: Control  





Panel  of firms  N  N 







R-squared   0.112  0.047 
No. observations  176,042  36,265 
No. firms  2,533  1,401 
 
Note: Real wage growth is defined as log wt+1 – log wt, where w is the real wage (deflated by cpi). All 
regressions control for age and its square, number of employees in the firm and its square and dummies 
for region, year, gender, tenure, occupation, salaried work and part-time work. See also notes to Tables 
1 and 2.  
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Table 5. Robustness checks for employment regressions with manual workers  
 
  Separations  Hours – all  Hours – 
remaining 
workers 
































































Note: The estimated effects refer to β2–β3  in specifications based on columns (1), (4) and (7) in Table 
2, except in the wage gap regressions (see text for details). The estimation period is 2001–05, except in 
the staggered treatment regressions in which the period is 2002–05. P-values within square brackets, 
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